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Construction Law
by Dennis J. Webb, Jr.*
Henry L. Balkeom IV**
and Dana R. Grantham***
This Article surveys construction law decisions handed down by
Georgia appellate courts between June 1, 2003, and May 31, 2004. The
cases discussed primarily fall within five categories: (1) contract; (2)
tort; (3) mechanics' and materialmen's liens; (4) arbitration; and
(5) legislation. The Article also includes a miscellaneous section covering
noteworthy cases that do not fit neatly into the sections enumerated
above.
I. CONTRACTS
The Georgia Court of Appeals decided several cases concerning claims
for breach of contract during the survey period.
A. Contractor'sClaim for Contract Balance; Substantiating
Documentation
In Department of Transportation v. Hardin-Sunbelt,' the court of
appeals affirmed the trial court's denial of defendant Department of
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Transportation's ("DOT") motion for directed verdict.2 Hardin-Sunbelt
("Hardin") sued the DOT to recover the contract balance on a $23 million
Sugarloaf Parkway project in Gwinnett County.3
The contract anticipated that a lake adjacent to the project that was
owned by Boeing Corporation could be used as a sediment basin during
construction. Hardin was required to restore the lake to its original
state by removing the silt that became deposited in the lake during
construction.4 The contract also required Hardin to construct a "rock
check dam to collect most sediment before it entered the lake."5 The
lake restoration item was included as "lump sum" in the contract
between the parties.'
Throughout the project, Hardin, through its subcontractor, constructed
the rock check dam and periodically removed large quantities of silt from
the lake. In September 1999 Boeing released the DOT, Hardin, and its
subcontractor from any liability with respect to the lake restoration.
Hardin subsequently sought payment of the lump sum stated in the
contract for the lake restoration item. In March 2000 the DOT refused
to make payment, stating that the lake restoration had not been
performed and directing Hardin to perform no further work on the lake
because Boeing had accepted it "as is." The DOT essentially based its
decision to withhold payment on the fact that Hardin and its subcontractor had not substantiated with contemporaneous documentation the fact
that the lake restoration work had actually been performed. However,
Hardin's subcontractor did present a job diary entry showing that silt
had been hauled out of the lake, and other employees of the subcontractor stated that they were present when the silt was hauled from the
lake.7
The court of appeals held that the contract's provisions clearly and
unambiguously entitled Hardin to the contract balance for the lake
restoration portion of the work.8 The DOT argued that the contract's
"claims for adjustments and disputes" section required Hardin to provide
substantiating backup documentation supporting that the lake restoration work was in fact completed? The court of appeals disagreed with
the DOT's argument because that portion of the contract applied only to

2. Id. at 146, 596 S.E.2d at 403.
3. Id. at 140, 596 S.E.2d at 398-99.
4. Id., 596 S.E.2d at 399.

5. Id.
6. Id.
7.
8.
9.

Id. at 142-43, 596 S.E.2d at 400-01.
Id. at 144, 596 S.E.2d at 401-02.
Id. at 143-44, 596 S.E.2d at 401.

2004]

CONSTRUCTION LAW

claims by the contractor for "additional compensation" and not to claims
for work that was already part of the contract between the parties. 10
In addition the DOT argued that the lake restoration work had been
eliminated from the contract in accordance with a provision that allowed
the DOT to eliminate, upon a written order, certain items from the scope
of the contractor's work. The DOT based this argument on the March
6, 2000 letter which directed Hardin to perform no further work on the
lake. However, all of Hardin's lake restoration work had been completed
before March 6, 2000. Furthermore, the contract provision relied upon
by the DOT also provided that Hardin would be reimbursed for actual
work performed and all costs incurred, including mobilization of
materials prior to any notification to eliminate items from the contract."
Lastly, the DOT argued that the award of attorney fees against it was
improper because there was no evidence to support it under the Official
Code of Georgia Annotated ("O.C.G.A.") section 13-6-11.12 Affirming
the award of attorney fees, the court of appeals held that the DOT's
refusal to pay for the lake restoration work during the course of the
execution of the contract provided the jury with a basis for finding that
litigious and caused Hardin unnecessary
the DOT was stubbornly
3
trouble and expense.'
Request for Equitable Adjustment for DisruptionDamages

B.

4
In Atlantic Coast Mechanical v. R. W Allen Beers Construction, R.
W. Allen Beers Construction ("Beers") entered into a subcontract
agreement with Atlantic Coast Mechanical ("ACM") for the mechanical
and plumbing work on the Children's Medical Center in Augusta,
Georgia. ACM submitted a request for equitable adjustment to Beers
based on additional costs incurred by ACM as a result of Beers's
disruptions to ACM's work. ACM subsequently filed suit based upon the
damages set forth in its request for equitable adjustment, among other
things. The trial court granted Beers's motion for summary judgment,
and ACM appealed. 5
The court of appeals reversed, disagreeing with Beers's arguments
that the contract precluded ACM's recovery of the costs identified in the

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

Id.
Id. at 145, 596 S.E.2d at 402.
O.C.G.A. § 13-6-11 (1981).
Hardin-Sunbelt, 266 Ga. App. at 146, 596 S.E.2d at 402-03.
264 Ga. App. 680, 592 S.E.2d 115 (2003).
Id. at 681-82, 592 S.E.2d at 116-17.
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request for equitable adjustment. 16 Specifically, Beers argued that (1)
ACM waived its claims by failing to object to Beers's April 29, 1998
letter within forty-eight hours; (2) ACM's claim was barred by article
3(b) of the subcontract because ACM was to take into account "'all
hindrances and delays incident to its [wlork'" upon entering into the
subcontract; (3) ACM had waived claims that it held by executing certain
change orders; and (4) ACM's claim was barred by the "no damages for
delay" 17provision in the agreement between Beers and the project
owner.
The court of appeals disagreed with Beers's first argument because the
subcontract provision relied upon by Beers only required an objection
within forty-eight hours regarding "any dispute concerning a question of
fact arising under this [a]greement."8 The April 29, 1998 letter from
Beers to ACM disputed whether ACM was legally entitled to assert its
claim, and the letter did not address "a question of fact." 9 Therefore,
under the plain language of the subcontract, ACM did not waive its
claim by failing to respond to Beers's letter.2"
The court of appeals also disagreed with Beers's argument that article
3(b) precluded additional compensation for disruptions. 2' The court
concluded that the language of article 3(b) only applied to hindrances
and delays that ACM could have foreseen upon entering into the
subcontract. ACM submitted evidence that the disruptions caused by
Beers far exceeded what would normally be expected at the time the
contract was executed.' In addition the court determined that article
3(b) and other cited provisions of the contract that Beers relied on were
silent with respect to ACM's entitlement to additional compensation for
unanticipated labor costs from disruptions or hindrances.24
Furthermore, the court of appeals disagreed that ACM had waived its
claim for disruption by signing certain change orders.25 Specifically,
the change order signed by ACM stated that the amount of the change
order included full compensation for delays encountered by ACM through
the date of the change order.26 The court of appeals determined that

16.
17.
18.
19.

Id. at 682, 592 S.E.2d at 117.
Id. at 681-82, 592 S.E.2d at 117-18.
Id. at 682, 592 S.E.2d at 117.
Id.

20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Id.
Id. at 683, 592 S.E.2d at 118.
Id.
Id.
Id.

25. Id. at 683-84, 592 S.E.2d at 118.

26. Id. at 684, 592 S.E.2d at 118.
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ACM's claim was based upon "disruption of its work, resulting in loss of
efficiency and increased labor costs" and not from delays.2 7 Relying
upon U.S. Industries v. Blake Construction Co.,2 the court of appeals
determined that the language in the change orders only addressed
Therefore, ACM's request for equitable
delays and not disruption.'
adjustment was not barred by the change orders and Beers was not
entitled to summary judgment.3 0
Finally, Beers argued that the "no damages for delay" provision in the
contract between Beers and the project owner precluded ACM's request
for equitable adjustment.3' The court of appeals disagreed that the "no
damages for delay" provision in the owner contract precluded recovery
because it was inconsistent with a provision of the subcontract.3 2 The
contract between Beers and the owner contained a broad "no damages
for delay" provision that only allowed damages for delays and hindrances
caused solely by the owner's fraud or bad faith.33 The subcontract
provided that "[ACM] shall be entitled to compensation for such
interruptions, interferences, inefficiencies, suspensions, or delays, not
attributable to [ACM's] fault or neglect, to the extent, but only to the
extent, [Beers] actually recovers compensation for same from the owner,"
which is arguably broader than the owner provision.' The subcontract
also contained a provision, which stated that in the event of an
inconsistency between the provisions of the subcontract and the owner
contract, the subcontract would control. 5 The court of appeals held
that summary judgment was improper because the provision of the
subcontract, under certain circumstances, allowed ACM to recover
compensation for claims like these in its request for equitable adjustment. 6
C.

Measure of Damages Where Repair is not Feasible

37
the court of appeals vacated the trial
In City of Atlanta v. Conner,
court's damages award in favor of the homeowner, Mrs. Conner
("Conner"), because the evidence presented at trial did not support the

27. Id.
28. 671 F.2d 539 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
29. Atlantic Coast, 264 Ga. App. at 684-85, 592 S.E.2d at 118-19.
30. Id. at 684, 592 S.E.2d at 118.
31. Id. at 684-85, 592 S.E.2d at 118-19.
32. Id. at 685, 592 S.E.2d at 119.
33. Id. at 684-85, 592 S.E.2d at 118-19.
34. Id. at 685, 592 S.E.2d at 119.

35. Id.
36.
37.

Id. at 685-86, 592 S.E.2d at 119.
262 Ga. App. 423, 585 S.E.2d 634 (2003).
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$100,000 award.38 Conner entered into a rehabilitation contract with
the City of Atlanta ("City") to bring her house up to code and make
Under the contract the City was
certain badly needed repairs.
responsible for selecting and hiring the builder. The City hired the
builder based on his low bid of $38,396.50. However, the builder later
defaulted on the contract, leaving the roof exposed and subjecting the
interior of the house to water damage. Between 1998 and 2000, Conner
made repeated attempts to get the City to finish the repair work. The
City eventually informed Conner that she would have to obtain a private
loan to finish the house, which by that time had suffered severe water
damage, making the home completely uninhabitable. 39
The trial court granted Conner's motion for summary judgment and
held a bench trial on the issue of damages. There was conflicting
evidence regarding the value of the home, the cost to repair, and the
value of the lot. However, the trial court based its award of $100,000
essentially on the cost to rebuild and upgrade the home.4 °
The court of appeals determined that the trial court's calculation of
damages was improper because returning the house to its original
condition would be an "absurd undertaking."4' The court of appeals
held that when the property has been damaged as a result of a breach
to the point it cannot be reasonably
repaired, the measure of damages is "the property's value as diminished by irremediable defects... deducted from the value of the house
as it should have been completed according to the contract .... If the
damage cannot be repaired, it seems pointless error to insist the value
be determined by cost of repair."4'
The court further concluded that it was impossible to determine the fair
market value of the property from the evidence that was presented at
the trial.43 "[Tlhe fair market value of the property must be proven,
and, although exact figures are not necessary, the trier of fact must be
able to 'reasonably estimate (the fair market value] without resort to
guess work.'" 44 Although evidence was presented on the fair market
value before and after the breach, the trial court made no findings on
those values and thereby prevented the court of appeals from determin-

38. Id. at 423, 585 S.E.2d at 634.
39. Id., 585 S.E.2d at 634-35.
40. Id. at 425, 585 S.E.2d at 635.

41.
42.
43.
44.

Id., 585 S.E.2d at 636.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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ing the proper amount of damages.45 Therefore, the court of appeals
remanded the case with instructions to calculate damages as follows:
"[Aldd the fair market value of the property if the contract had been
properly performed plus the cost to Conner for removing the existing
structure, then subtract the value of the existing structure following the
breach, and subtract the value of the lot."'
D. Nominal Damages;Attorney Fees; Cross Examination
In McEntyre v. Edwards,47 McEntyre entered into a contract with E/P
Construction, LLC and its general manager, Edwards, for the construction of a residence. The relationship quickly deteriorated. During
construction, the parties discovered cracks in the foundation wall, and
each hired inspectors to examine the wall. Edwards offered to repair it,
but McEntyre demanded that the wall be torn down and the foundation
be completely replaced. Edwards suggested mediation when the parties
could not reach an agreement on the appropriate repair. McEntyre
responded by terminating the contract and filing suit for negligent
construction, breach of contract, and fraud. The jury returned a verdict
in favor of Edwards, ordering McEntyre to pay $1.00 in 48nominal
damages and $75,000 in attorney fees and litigation expenses.
On appeal McEntyre argued that the trial court erred in granting
Edwards's motion for directed verdict on McEntyre's fraud claim.49 The
court of appeals disagreed, stating that the evidence showed that
McEntyre was fully aware of the condition of the foundation wall, and
there was no evidence that McEntyre relied on any statements made by
Edwards.5"
Next, McEntyre argued that her motion for directed verdict on
Edwards's counterclaim for breach of contract should have been granted
because, according to McEntyre, she could not have committed a breach
The court of appeals again
by terminating the contract early.5
disagreed, concluding that the jury was authorized to find that McEntyre
acted unreasonably in terminating the contract by insisting that the
entire foundation be completely replaced.52

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Id. at 425-26, 585 S.E.2d at 636.
Id. at 426, 585 S.E.2d at 636.
261 Ga. App. 843, 583 S.E.2d 889 (2003).
Id. at 843-44, 583 S.E.2d at 890.
Id. at 844, 583 S.E.2d at 890.
Id. at 844-46, 583 S.E.2d at 891-92.
Id.
Id. at 845, 583 S.E.2d at 891.
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McEntyre also argued that her motion for directed verdict on the
counterclaim should have been granted because Edwards could not prove
that he had incurred any actual damages.5 3 However, the court of
appeals held that the award of nominal damages was properly based
upon O.C.G.A. section 13-6-6, 54 which allows nominal damages for the
cost of bringing an action. 5
In addition McEntyre argued that the trial court erred in restricting
her cross examination of Edwards regarding allegedly inconsistent
pretrial arguments made by his attorneys for impeachment purposes.56
The court of appeals held that the arguments of a party's counsel cannot
serve as a basis for impeaching a party.57
Finally, the court of appeals rejected McEntyre's argument that the
court improperly refused McEntyre's jury instruction which stated:
"Even though the constructed product actually received under the
contract may be suitable for the purpose, each contracting party is
entitled to receive the constructed product anticipated by the contract,
unless the party waives it."5 The court of appeals concluded that the
case upon which this instruction was based was inapplicable to the facts
because there was no evidence that Edwards had substituted one
9
product for another with respect to the construction of the foundation.
Bona Fide Controversy;Attorney Fees
In Clearwater Construction Co. v. McClung,"° McClung entered into
a contract with Clearwater Construction Company for the purchase of
a spec home constructed by Clearwater. The exterior of the home
consisted of an "external foam installation system" ("EFIS"). Clearwater
had very little experience with EFIS construction. The sales contract for
the house stated that Clearwater was "'to furnish [McClung] in writing
a binding warranty covering any and all defects of the structure for a
period of one (1) year from date of closing."'' The sales contract was
further amended to state that Clearwater was "'to correct Drivet system
at all windows, doors, openings and deck per the "Dryvit Corporation
Installation Instructions" which are attached.' 562 This amendment

E.

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Id.
O.C.G.A. § 13-6-6 (1982).
McEntyre, 261 Ga. App. at 846, 583 S.E.2d at 891.
Id., 583 S.E.2d at 892.
Id. at 844-46, 583 S.E.2d at 891-92.
Id. at 847, 583 S.E.2d at 892.
Id.
261 Ga. App. 789, 584 S.E.2d 61 (2003).
Id. at 790, 584 S.E.2d at 62.
Id., 584 S.E.2d at 63.
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language was ultimately marked out, and additional language was
added reflecting that the Drivet system had been corrected in accordance
with an inspection report.6"
Shortly after moving in, McClung began to notice problems with the
EFIS system. He retained inspectors and began exchanging letters with
Clearwater. The last inspector recommended the removal and replacement of the EFIS and estimated that it would cost $41,051.18."
A bench trial was held on McClung's claims for breach of warranty,
fraud, and violations of the Georgia Fair Business Practices Act.65 The
trial court found for Clearwater on the fraud and Fair Business Practices
Act claims but against Clearwater on the breach of warranty claim.
Clearwater argued on appeal that attorney fees were improper because
the court found in Clearwater's favor on two of McClung's claims,
thereby showing a bona fide controversy, and precluding the grant of
attorney fees in favor of McClung.66 The court of appeals held that the
authorities relied upon by Clearwater had been impliedly overruled, and
Georgia law allowed an award of attorney fees even when the court
found for the defendant on some claims and against the defendant on
others.6 7 The court of appeals concluded there was ample evidence in
the record to support the trial court's finding that Clearwater adopted
a "sue me" attitude and thereby caused unnecessary trouble and expense
to McClung.68
F

Motion for New Trial; Late Discovery of Evidence and Damages

In Hopper v. M & B Builders, Inc.,69 homeowners Cecil and Delores
Hopper entered into a contract with M & B Builders for the construction
Shortly after foundation construction began, the
of their home.
homeowners directed construction workers on the site to move the
location of the foundation twenty-two feet back from its original location.
Due to the severe slope of the lot, the movement of the house required
additional truckloads of fill dirt and increased the cost of the home by
$38,225. After learning of the homeowners' instructions to move the
foundation, the builder notified the homeowners of the additional costs.
The homeowners refused to pay, and the parties' relationship quickly
deteriorated. The builder ultimately sold the house for $308,300 and

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id.
Id. at 791, 584 S.E.2d at 64.
O.C.G.A. § 10-1-390 (2000).
McClung, 261 Ga. App. at 792, 584 S.E.2d at 64.
Id. at 791-92, 584 S.E.2d at 63-64.
Id., 584 S.E.2d at 64.
261 Ga. App. 702, 583 S.E.2d 533 (2003).
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sued the homeowners for $82,000 in losses. The homeowners filed a
counterclaim for the return of their $5000 deposit. The jury returned a
verdict in favor of the builder for $64,963.70

On appeal the homeowners argued that their motion for a new trial
should have been granted because they discovered new evidence after
the trial that revealed one of the builder's witnesses perjured himself."
The court of appeals disagreed, stating that the homeowners had not
satisfied the six-prong test for a new trial.72
To obtain a new trial based on newly discovered evidence, the evidence
supporting the motion must satisfy six criteria: (1) it must have been
discovered after the trial or hearing; (2) its late discovery was not due
to lack of diligence; (3) it is so material that its introduction in evidence
would probably produce a different result; (4) it is not merely cumulative; (5) the affidavit of the witness must be attached to the motion (or
its absence accounted for); and (6) it does not operate only to impeach
a witness.7"
The court of appeals determined that the homeowners failed to use
diligence because the newly discovered information could have been
obtained from a witness who was listed during the discovery as having
information pertaining to the facts and circumstances of the case.74
Furthermore, the homeowners failed to show that the newly discovered
evidence would produce a different verdict.75
G. Damages for Breach of Contract;Attorney Fees
In Morrison Homes of Florida v. Wade,7" the court of appeals
affirmed the trial court's denial of Morrison Homes of Florida, Inc.'s
("Builder") motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict ("JNOV")
following the jury's award of damages and attorney fees to the homeowners, the Wades.." Builder furnished a blanket warranty to the homeowners that provided for a series of post-closing inspections "at 40 days,
11 months and 22 months after closing."7 8 The homeowners notified
Builder of cracks in the concrete garage slab, front walkway and steps,
and center column of the front garage wall. Builder responded by

70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Id. at 702-03, 583 S.E.2d at 534-35.
Id. at 703, 583 S.E.2d at 535.
Id. at 704, 583 S.E.2d at 536.
Id.
Id. at 706, 583 S.E.2d at 537.
Id. at 704-05, 583 S.E.2d at 536.
266 Ga. App. 598, 598 S.E.2d 358 (2004).
Id. at 598, 598 S.E.2d at 360.
Id.
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installing crack gauges to monitor the expansion of the driveway cracks.
Builder later notified the homeowners that the devices did not reveal
crack thicknesses covered by the warranty. Builder also attempted to
repair the front walkway and steps, but the homeowners were not
satisfied with those efforts. v9
The homeowners also retained a general contractor, structural
engineer, and geotechnical engineer to inspect the home and perform
various tests on the soil underneath the garage. The result of these
inspections and tests revealed that there was no footing underneath the
garage column, though it was a load-bearing structure. The homeowners
also discovered other building code violations and Builder's failure to
follow its own plans for the construction of the house. The homeowners
presented this evidence at trial and the jury awarded the homeowners
$68,460 in damages and $71,540 in attorney fees. °
On appeal Builder argued that its motion for JNOV should have been
granted because the homeowners failed to introduce enough evidence at
trial to allow the jury to ascertain damages within a reasonable degree
of certainty."1 The court of appeals disagreed, concluding that the
homeowners' construction expert testified that the cost to repair the
home would be $87,642, which was supported by his testimony and a
written estimate. 2
Builder also argued that the award of attorney fees was improper
because the homeowners failed to prove bad faith. Specifically, Builder
asserted that phone calls and correspondence with the homeowners
indicated that Builder was trying to resolve any problems. Furthermore,
one of the homeowners admitted that the cracks in the driveway were
not of sufficient size to be covered by the Builder's warranty.8 3
However, the court of appeals noted the homeowners introduced evidence
showing that the communication between the homeowners and Builder
was a delay tactic by the Builder to prevent the discovery of other
In addition the
problems before the end of the two year warranty.'
court of appeals determined the evidence that Builder violated a number
of building codes and its own design plans could also serve as a basis for
the jury to find bad faith. 5

79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Id.
Id. at 598-99, 598 S.E.2d at 360.
Id. at 599, 598 S.E.2d at 360.
Id., 598 S.E.2d at 361.
Id. at 600, 598 S.E.2d at 361.
Id. at 600-01, 598 S.E.2d at 361-62.
Id.
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H. Takeover Agreements; Payment Bonds; Discussion of Subcontractor's Obligation to Perform
In Carolina Casualty Insurance Co. v. Ragan,6 the court of appeals
affirmed the trial court's grant of partial summary judgment in favor of
the subcontractor Ragan. 7 The court held that Ragan's obligations
under its subcontract were terminated when the owner of the project
terminated the general contractor's performance, even though the owner
had not terminated the entire general contract.88
During the project the board of education terminated the second
contractor, Latco's, "right to proceed" on the project because Latco was
in default. Latco had provided performance and payment bonds for the
project, which were issued by co-sureties Carolina Casualty and Everest
Reinsurance Company. Latco's co-sureties subsequently executed a
takeover agreement with the board of education and agreed to complete
Latco's general contract. In furtherance of the takeover agreement, the
co-sureties engaged de Oplossing, Inc. to complete the project. De
Oplossing in turn requested that each of Latco's subcontractors enter
into a ratification agreement agreeing to complete their respective scopes
of work on the project. Ragan declined to enter into the ratification
agreement and, instead, requested payment for its work under the
payment bond.89
On the cross motion for partial summary judgment, the co-sureties
argued that Ragan was obligated to proceed with its work because the
entire general contract between Latco and the School Board had not
The applicable subcontract provision stated
been terminated. °
"'s]hould [the Board of Education] terminate the [general] Contract or
any part of the [general] Contract which includes the Subcontractor's
Work, this Contract shall also be terminated and Subcontractor shall
immediately stop Subcontractor's related work."' 9 1
The court of appeals concluded that the clear language of the
subcontract showed that the parties intended that Ragan's work would
be terminated upon the termination of "any part" of the general

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

262 Ga. App. 6, 584 S.E.2d 646 (2003).
Id. at 6, 584 S.E.2d at 647.
Id. at 8, 584 S.E.2d at 648.
Id. at 6-7, 584 S.E.2d at 647.
Id. at 7, 584 S.E.2d at 647.
Id.
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contract.9 2 Therefore, the trial court correctly found that the subcontract had been terminated.9 3
II.

TORTS

Georgia appellate courts decided a variety of tort-related construction
cases during the survey period. The tort-related cases deal with the
topics of non-delegable duties, fraud, merger clauses, and liability of
independent contractors, among others.
A.

Intrinsically Dangerous Work; Non-Delegable Duty

In Luther v. Wayne Frier Home Center of Tifton, Inc.,' plaintiffs
purchased a mobile home. The mobile home price included the cost of
delivery and set-up. The mobile home seller hired a subcontractor to
perform these tasks."
Set-up of the new mobile home involved removal of the old one. While
attempting this feat, a welder working for the subcontractor caused the
old trailer to catch fire, destroying its contents. Plaintiff sued the mobile
home seller for negligence, among other things. The mobile home seller
moved for summary judgment, which the trial court granted. Plaintiff
appealed, arguing that material questions of fact remained regarding the
mobile home seller's own negligence, and whether it had a non-delegable
duty regarding the welding, which plaintiff characterized as "intrinsically dangerous work." 6
On review the court of appeals rejected plaintiff's argument.97 The
court noted that as a general rule, "the employer remains liable for
negligence of a contractor if, 'according to the employer's previous
knowledge and experience, the work to be done is in its nature
dangerous to others however carefully performed."'9 8 The court stated
that no Georgia case had decided whether welding was an inherently
dangerous activity.99 Relying on authority from other jurisdictions, the
court concluded that it was not and stated:
The use of a cutting torch is an activity which, if carried on properly
and by competent and careful operators, is not in itself inherently

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Id. at 8, 584 S.E.2d at 648.
Id. at 9, 584 S.E.2d at 648.
264 Ga. App. 827, 592 S.E.2d 470 (2003).
Id. at 827, 592 S.E.2d at 471.
Id. at 828, 592 S.E.2d at 471.
Id. at 828-29, 592 S.E.2d at 472.
Id. at 828, 592 S.E.2d at 472 (citations omitted).
Id.
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dangerous. It does not pose the risk and danger to others or others'
property when properly conducted as does the use of explosives,
corrosives or other similarly inherently dangerous activities and
products.l°"
B.

Fraudulentand Passive Concealment;Merger Clause

In Browning v. Stocks, 10 a contractor sold a home in which he had
resided for a number of years. Plaintiff sued the contractor for hidden
and undisclosed termite damage under the doctrines of fraudulent
concealment and fraudulent inducement. During the time he lived in
maintenance
the home, the contractor had performed routine annual
10 2
and, according to plaintiff, hid signs of termite damage.
The court of appeals, sitting en banc, held that the buyer's claim of
fraudulent inducement could not be based on any affirmative misrepresentations preceding the execution of the purchase agreement due to the
agreement's merger clause.'0 ' The court concluded, however, that the
merger clause did not prevent a claim based on "actively or passively
concealed damage or defects in the purchased property." 4 The court
observed that the "passive concealment" doctrine is applied to residential
real estate transactions as an exception to the doctrine of caveat
emptor. °5 The court further clarified the remedies available to a
purchaser discovering such fraud, which include either promptly
rescinding the subject contract and suing in tort for fraud, or affirming
the contract and suing for damages due to breach."°
C.

Independent Contractor

In McCaskill v. Carillo,0 7 plaintiff worked for Compaq. Compaq
hired a contractor to install carpeting in its offices. At one point the
contractor ran out of carpet tiles. As a result, a hallway was only
partially recarpeted, leaving the area in front of the entrance to the
restroom with a bare concrete floor. Plaintiff had been in and out of the
men's room while the floor was in this condition and had entered the
restroom without incident the day of the accident. When he left the

100.
(1980)).
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Id. at 829, 592 S.E.2d at 472 (quoting Woodward v. Mettille, 400 N.E.2d 934, 942
265 Ga. App. 803, 595 S.E.2d 642 (2004).
Id. at 804, 595 S.E.2d at 644.
Id. at 803, 595 S.E.2d at 643-44.
Id. at 806, 595 S.E.2d at 646.
Id. at 804 n.2, 595 S.E.2d at 644 n.2.
Id. at 805-06, 595 S.E.2d at 645.
263 Ga. App. 890, 589 S.E.2d 582 (2003).
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restroom on that occasion, however, he tripped over the 3/8 inch height
difference between the concrete floor and carpet and fell, suffering
injuries.'08
Plaintiff sued the carpet installer for negligence, who later moved for
summary judgment. The trial court denied the motion and the carpet
installer appealed. On review the carpet installer argued that it should
have been entitled to summary judgment for two reasons: (1) it was an
independent contractor, and (2) the simple fact that there was a height
difference between the carpet and ground did not constitute negligence. 10 9
First, the court held that because
The appellate court agreed."'
Compaq was in day-to-day control of the contractor's work, knew that
the contractor had run out of carpet squares, and approved the carpet
installer's leaving areas at the workplace with concrete abutting until
more squares could be obtained, the contractor could not be held
liable."' The court determined that "[where an independent contractor or supplier properly executes the directions of the owner, only the
owner, not the contractor or supplier, may be liable for injury to a third
party resulting therefrom.""' 2 Second, the court also agreed that the
height difference between the carpet and ground did not constitute
negligence as a matter of law: "[Tihe 'mere existence or maintenance of
or steps in a business building does not
a difference in floor levels
113
constitute negligence.' "
D.

Violation of Building Codes; Negligence Per Se

In Hicks v. Walker,"4 plaintiff, a two year old child, went with her
family to a cookout at the home of friends. The cookout was on a deck.
The deck collapsed and seriously injured the child. After the accident,
plaintiff's family sent a professional home inspector to the home to
review the deck. He testified by affidavit that the deck was not built
according to the minimum standards required by Georgia building codes.
The inspector's findings included:
[Tihe deck failed at the point at which the deck was attached to the
house, and the deck had been attached to the house with carpentry

108. Id. at 890-91, 589 S.E.2d at 582-83.
109. Id. at 891-92, 589 S.E.2d at 583-84.
110. Id., 589 S.E.2d at 584.
111. Id. at 891, 589 S.E.2d at 584.
112. Id. (citations omitted).
113. Id. at 892, 589 S.E.2d at 584 (quoting Bramblett v. Earl Smith Floors, 227 Ga.
App. 296, 297, 481 S.E.2d 766, 767 (1997)).
114. 262 Ga. App. 216, 585 S.E.2d 83 (2003).
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nails, though the codes require the use of hex bolts; contrary to code
requirements, no flashing was used to protect the wood from water
damage, and the wood was damaged as a result; the support posts were
set on top of cinder blocks instead of being set into a foundation
sufficient to support the weight load of the deck; and the posts were
improperly "toe-nailed" into the deck." 5
According to the inspector, the deck was unsafe and unfit for the use for
11 6
which it was constructed, and it would not have passed inspection.
Plaintiff filed suit and the homeowner moved for summary judgment.
The trial court granted the homeowner's motion and plaintiff appealed.l"1
On review, the court of appeals reversed. 1 8 The court noted that:
A landowner is liable if, but only if, (a) the possessor knows or has
reason to know of the condition and should realize that it involves an
unreasonable risk of harm to such licensees, and should expect that
they will not discover or realize the danger, and (b) he fails to exercise
reasonable care to make the conditions safe, or to warn the licensees
of the condition and the risk involved. The test for liability here is the
owner's superior knowledge of the hazard. In cases of defective
construction, the owner is presumed to have notice of the danger. 19
Second, the court concluded that this principle did not support the
homeowner's motion for summary judgment:
[Gliven an owner's presumed knowledge of a construction defect, an
owner's duty to inspect the premises to discover possible dangerous
conditions of which he does not have actual knowledge, an owner's duty
to comply with building codes, the fact that noncompliance with code
standards may be proof of an owner's superior knowledge of a defect,
and the fact that the injured person was a child. Because a child may
be unable to appreciate a danger, an owner may be held to a higher
standard of care toward a child than toward an adult. 2 °
The
Similarly, in Johnston v. Ross, 21 plaintiff rented a home.
home's front steps lacked handrails, which constituted a violation of the
applicable building code. Plaintiff was injured in a fall from the steps
and sued her landlord, claiming negligence. The landlord moved for
summary judgment, arguing that plaintiff's claim was barred because

115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

Id. at 217, 585 S.E.2d at 85-86.
Id. at 217-18, 585 S.E.2d at 86.
Id. at 217, 585 S.E.2d at 85.
Id.
Id. at 218, 585 S.E.2d at 86.
Id. at 219, 585 S.E.2d at 87.
264 Ga. App. 252, 590 S.E.2d 386 (2003).
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plaintiff had been in the home for months and knew that the front steps
lacked handrails before the fall. The trial court granted summary
judgment and the court of appeals reversed.'22 On review the court
noted that "'although the defect was obvious when [plaintiff] took
possession of the apartment, that is not necessarily a bar to recovery
when the defect is in violation of a duty created by applicable statute or
administrative regulation.'"' 2
E.

Fraudand Punitive Damages

In Bowen & Bowen Construction Co. v. Fowler,124 the homeowner,
Fowler, sued Bowen & Bowen Construction Company ("Builder") for
breach of contract, fraud, and punitive damages when Builder failed to
correct flooding problems in the backyard of a residence that homeowner
purchased from Builder. 125 The court of appeals affirmed the jury
verdict in favor of the homeowner in the amount of $100,000 in
compensatory damages, $33,000 in attorney fees, and $500,000 in
punitive damages, which
was reduced to $250,000 pursuant to O.C.G.A.
126
section 51-12-5.1(g).
Before closing the home purchase, the seventy-nine year old homeowner and Builder walked through the house and compiled a "punch list" of
items that Builder agreed to fix, including a problem of standing water
in the backyard. During the two years following the closing, the
homeowner made several demands that Builder repair the standing
water problem. However, Builder made no meaningful attempts to
repair the problem and ultimately informed
the homeowner that it had
127
no intention of repairing the problem.
At trial the homeowner introduced ten videotapes starting in August
1998, which showed large areas of standing water in the backyard, in
some places, almost one foot deep. The homeowner's expert witness
testified that the backyard was essentially a "bowl" that collected water
from the street and neighboring yards. Builder did not produce an
expert at the trial. However, the jury heard evidence that Builder had
hired an expert who had studied Fowler's property and made a report.'2 8

122. Id. at 253, 590 S.E.2d at 387.
123. Id. at 254, 590 S.E.2d at 386 (quoting Bastien v. Metro. Park Lake Ass'n, 209 Ga.
App. 881, 434 S.E.2d 736 (1993)).
124. 265 Ga. App. 274, 593 S.E.2d 668 (2004).
125. Id. at 274, 593 S.E.2d at 668.
126. Id., 593 S.E.2d at 669; O.C.G.A. § 51-12-5.1(g) (2000).
127. Bowen, 265 Ga. App. at 274-75, 593 S.E.2d at 670.
128. Id. at 275, 593 S.E.2d at 670.
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Builder argued that the trial court erred in denying its motion for
directed verdict on the homeowner's fraud claim.'29 The court of
appeals affirmed the fraud award because the homeowner had presented
evidence on each of the elements of fraud, including misrepresentation.13 0 Specifically, the court of appeals determined that there was
evidence that Builder had promised to repair the standing water
problem, and that an employee of Builder later informed the homeowner
that Builder had no intention of repairing the problem. 3 '
Builder also argued that the punitive damages award was excessive. 11 2 The court of appeals disagreed, concluding that the award
complied with the guideposts set forth in BMW of North America v.
Gore.' Furthermore, the court determined that
In reviewing punitive damage awards, courts are required to consider
three guideposts: "(1) the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's
misconduct; (2) the disparity between the actual or potential harm
suffered by the plaintiff and the punitive damages award; and (3) the
difference between the punitive damages awarded by the jury and the
civil penalties authorized or imposed in comparable cases."' 34
The court noted that the award of punitive damages was less than four
times the amount of compensatory damages and, therefore, was within
constitutional limitations.'3 5 Furthermore, the Georgia Fair Business
37
Practices Act 36 authorizes treble damages for similar violations.
Because the punitive damages award of $250,000 was only two and onehalf times the $100,000 compensatory damages amount, the punitive
damages award was not excessive as a matter of law.'38

.III.

MECHANICS' AND MATERIALMEN'S LIENS

During the survey period, the Georgia Court of Appeals broke no new
ground in the area of lien law. The court did, however, take the
opportunity to clarify the law on slander or defamation of title.

129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

Id. at 276, 593 S.E.2d at 671.
Id.
Id. at 276-77, 593 S.E.2d at 671.
Id. at 277, 593 S.E.2d at 671-72.
Id. at 277-78, 593 S.E.2d at 671; 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
Bowen, 265 Ga. App. at 277-78, 593 S.E.2d at 671 (citation omitted).
Id. at 278, 593 S.E.2d at 672.
O.C.G.A. § 10-1-390 (2000).
Bowen, 265 Ga. App. at 278, 593 S.E.2d at 672.
Id.
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A.

Defamation ConcerningLand
In Premier Cabinets, Inc. v. Bulat,"s Joseph Bulat and Premier
Cabinets, Inc. ("Premier") entered into a written agreement for the
installation of custom designed and built cabinets. After a dispute arose
between the parties over Premier's alleged deficient fabrication and
installation of the cabinets, Bulat filed suit against Premier and two of
its principals alleging, among numerous other claims, a wrongful lien
against his property and slander of title. Premier counterclaimed for
breach of contract, recovery of commercial account, foreclosure of
materialman's
lien, and litigation expenses pursuant to O.C.G.A. section
13-6-11. 140
At trial the jury found in favor of Premier in the amount of $6,064.44.
The jury also found in favor of Bulat for his claim of negligent construction, bond fees, and attorney fees, in a total amount of approximately
$21,000. After thejury trial, the trial court granted Premier's motion for
directed verdict on the slander of title claim. Both parties appealed.'
With regard to the slander of title directed verdict, the court of
appeals affirmed, concluding there was no error.4 2 O.C.G.A. section
51-9-11"l defines slander of title to land as follows: "'The owner of
any estate in lands may bring an action for libelous or slanderous words
which falsely and maliciously impugn his title if any damage accrues to
him therefrom.'"'"
As the court reiterated, the essential elements of this tort are: "(1)
publication of slanderous or libelous words; (2) that they were malicious;
(3) that the plaintiff sustained special damages thereby; and (4) that the
" 145
plaintiff possessed an estate in the property slandered or libeled.
The slander of title claim that Bulat filed was based on the allegation
that Premier wrongfully filed a materialman's lien against his proper46
ty.1

In reviewing Bulat's appellate brief, however, the court determined
there was no evidence that Premier acted with malice in filing the lien
notice to protect its right to recover its contract balance. 14' Nor was

139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

261 Ga. App. 578, 583 S.E.2d 235 (2003).
Id. at 578-79, 583 S.E.2d at 236-37; O.C.G.A. § 13-6-11 (Supp. 2004).
PremierCabinets, 261 Ga. App. at 579, 583 S.E.2d at 236.
Id. at 583, 583 S.E.2d at 239.
O.C.G.A. § 51-9-11 (2000).
Id.
PremierCabinets, 261 Ga. App. at 583, 583 S.E.2d at 239.
Id.
Id.
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there any evidence that the amount Premier set forth in the lien notice
was inaccurate in any way, or that Premier, "knowing of any alleged
false statement, acted in a fashion inconsistent with its statutory
On the
privilege to file a lien to protect its right of recovery."'
contrary, the evidence showed that Premier believed the balance of the
contract was due "upon delivery" and not "upon completion."' 49
Although Bulat cited Melton v. Bow' 50 to support his assertion that
malice may be inferred from the totality of the circumstances, the court
determined the case to be wholly inapplicable to the present dispute.' 5 '
First, Melton did not involve the filing of a materialman's lien. 52
Second, unlike Mr. Bulat, the complaining party in Melton did not
53
actually request that the alleged slanderous statement be made.
The court determined it was significant that Bulat had ordered Premier
to "go ahead and file a lien against the property [because Premier]
wouldn't get the [balance of] ...

their money in 30 years. " "

Based on the court's determination that there were no false statements
in the notice of lien that Premier filed and that its principals either
verdict on
authorized or signed, the court concluded that the directed
1 55
Bulat's slander of title claim had been correctly granted.
In Simmons v. Futral' a property owner, Simmons, brought an
action against a surveyor for defamation of title after the surveyor,
Futral, was hired to survey and subdivide three lots. Simmons became
unhappy with the surveyor's work, and the parties could not agree on
Futral's fee. Futral recorded his surveyor's lien on all three parcels even
though Futral had allegedly received payment for his services on two of
the lots surveyed. In response Simmons sued Futral for, among other
claims, libel, libel per se, and defamation of title. The trial court granted
summary judgment to Futral on the defamation and slander of title
action, and Simmons appealed, contending that the trial court erred in
according the language contained in the surveyor's lien absolute
privilege under O.C.G.A. section 51-5-8.15
As stated above, "[d]efamation of title requires: (1) publication of
slanderous or libelous words; (2) with malice; (3) causing special
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Id.
Id, 583 S.E.2d at 240.
145 Ga. App. 272, 243 S.E.2d 590 (1978).
Premier Cabinets, 261 Ga. App. at 584, 583 S.E.2d at 240.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 583-84, 583 S.E.2d at 240.
Id. at 584, 583 S.E.2d at 240.
262 Ga. App. 838, 586 S.E.2d 732 (2003).
Id. at 838, 586 S.E.2d at 733; O.C.G.A. § 51-5-8 (2000).
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damages; and (4) regarding property in which the plaintiff has an
ownership interest.""'8 Furthermore, "A false lien may support a cause
of action for defamation of title ... but the statements in the lien must
be false, and the lien claimant must be aware of their falsity."' 59
The record below showed that Futral did in fact receive payment for
his work on two of the lots. The record also showed, however, that the
surveyor later performed additional work on those lots at the property
owner's request. Simmons presented no evidence that he paid the
surveyor for the additional work or that no additional payment was
owed." e
Futral argued that pursuant to O.C.G.A. section 51-5-8, statements in
liens should be absolutely privileged as a matter of public policy because
filing such a lien is a statutory prerequisite to bringing an action to
161
enforce the lien.
Historically, in Georgia, persons who make defamatory statements in
pleadings are granted absolute privilege from suit. 2 Even if such
charges, allegations, or averments are false and malicious, for public
policy reasons they are not deemed to be libelous."6 The Georgia
Supreme Court has reasoned that without such a broad privilege, "every
complaint filed could generate a counterclaim for defamation."'
The
privilege promotes the public welfare by giving room for participants to
speak their minds without the risk of "a criminal prosecution or an
action for the recovery of damages."'65
Posing a potential conflict for the court were two past, seemingly
contradictory court of appeals cases dealing with allegedly defamatory
mechanic's liens. In Carl E. Jones Development, Inc. v. Wilson," the
court held that the absolute privilege did not apply to an allegedly
defamatory mechanic's lien. 67 This holding was based on the proposition that a lien is not a pleading, but merely evidence. 168 Later cases

158. Simmons, 262 Ga. App. at 842, 586 S.E.2d at 735 (citing O.C.G.A. § 51-9-11).
159. Id. (citing Lincoln Log Homes Mktg. v. Hollbrook, 163 Ga. App. 592, 594, 295
S.E.2d 567, 569 (1982); Daniels v. Johnson, 191 Ga. App. 70, 73, 381 S.E.2d 87, 90-91
(1989)).
160. Id.
161. Id. at 838-39, 586 S.E.2d at 733.
162. Id. (citing O.C.G.A. § 51-5-8 (2003)).
163. Id. at 839, 586 S.E.2d at 733 (citing Fedderwitz v. Lamb, 195 Ga. 691, 696, 25
S.E.2d 414, 418 (1943)).
164. Id. (quoting Stewart v. Walton, 254 Ga. 81, 82, 326 S.E.2d 738, 739 (1985)).
165. Id.
166. 149 Ga. App. 679, 255 S.E.2d 135 (1979).
167. Simmons, 262 Ga. App. at 839, 586 S.E.2d at 733 (citing Carl E. Jones Dev., 149
Ga. App. at 679, 255 S.E.2d at 135).
168. Id.
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extended the absolute privilege not just to pleadings, but also to certain
statements made during trial, as well as valid lis pendens.6 9 In
Eurostyle, Inc. v. Jones, 70 the court determined that filing a lien and
an action to enforce that lien were privileged under O.C.G.A. section 515-8.171
The court, however, determined that these cases were not irreconcilable because their holdings were worded very generally, and their facts
were distinguishable.172 Citing related Georgia precedent, guidance
from sister states, and Georgia's own lien statutes, the court declared
that a lien and the statements made within it are not afforded absolute
privilege until the lien is attached to a lawsuit and verified notice of the
suit is filed.'7
Because the surveyor, Futral, never filed a verified
notice following the filing of his counterclaim, the court held that the
statements made in his lien were not subject to the absolute privilege
under O.C.G.A. section 51-5-8.114 Nevertheless, despite the absence
of absolute privilege, the court affirmed the lower court's ruling because
75
Simmons failed to establish that Futral's lien statements were false.1
IV.

ARBITRATION

During the survey period, the Georgia Court of Appeals rendered a
number of decisions relative to the issue of arbitration. No issues of first
impression came before the court. However, the court did render
opinions regarding the validity and enforceability of a party's agreement
to arbitrate, waiver of the right to arbitrate, the arbitrability of appealrelated attorney fees, and restated the conditions under which an
arbitration award may be vacated.
A.

Validity and Enforceability of Agreement to Arbitrate

In Laird v. Risbergs,'76 the court of appeals reversed the trial court's
decision ordering the parties to submit to arbitration. 7 7 The plaintiffs,
Kent and Andrea Laird, entered into an agreement with Peter Risbergs
for the construction and purchase of a new home. The agreement

169.
170.

Carl E. Jones Dev., 149 Ga. App. at 681, 255 S.E.2d at 135.
197 Ga. App. 188, 397 S.E.2d 620 (1990).

171. Simmons, 262 Ga. App. at 840,586 S.E.2d at 734 (quoting Eurostyle, Inc. v. Jones,
197 Ga. App. 188, 397 S.E.2d 620 (1990)).
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Id,

173. Id.
174.

Id. at 841, 586 S.E.2d at 734.

175. Id. at 842, 586 S.E.2d at 735.
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266 Ga. App. 107, 596 S.E.2d 412 (2004).

177. Id. at 109, 596 S.E.2d at 414.
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provided that Risbergs would supply to the homeowners at closing, or
soon thereafter, a builder's warranty and that the homeowners would
waive any implied warranties in favor of those provided in the express
warranty. The only mention of arbitration in the parties' agreement
referred to voluntary arbitration as follows:
All parties to this Agreement acknowledge that, in the event of a
dispute arising after execution of this Agreement, there is a voluntary
"Binding Arbitration Procedure" available to the parties to this
Agreement in accordance with the Official Code of Georgia (O.C.G.A.)
Sec. 9-9-1 et seq., provided
78 all parties to this Agreement concur in
writing to abide by same.'
The Lairds did not put their initials next to the arbitration clause in
the agreement. Although the agreement referenced the warranty, it did
not disclose that any additional arbitration provision would be included
as part of the warranty. Within a few months, the closing took place
and the Lairds received the warranty, which contained a separate
mandatory arbitration provision requiring that disputes about the
quality of the home construction and other issues covered under the
warranty be submitted for arbitration before the homeowners could
initiate litigation. There was no evidence in the record showing that the
homeowners ever signed a document indicating they were aware of this
separate mandatory arbitration provision contained in the warranty.'79
After a dispute arose between the parties concerning defects in the
home construction, the Lairds filed a lawsuit against Risbergs for,
among other claims, fraud, defective workmanship, and negligent
construction. They did not sue on the warranty. After litigating for a
year, Risbergs demanded arbitration pursuant to the warranty's
arbitration provision, which the trial court granted. After the homeowners' motion for reconsideration was denied, they appealed.8 0
On appeal the Lairds contended that because they elected not to sue
under the warranty and they never initialed the arbitration provision in
the sale agreement, they could not be compelled to submit to arbitra8 1
tion."
The court of appeals agreed.182 In reversing the trial court's
decision, the court of appeals explained that the Georgia Arbitration
Code, O.C.G.A. section 9-9-1,'8 provides the exclusive means by which

178. Id. at 107-08, 596 S.E.2d at 413 (emphasis added).
179. Id. at 108, 596 S.E.2d at 413-14.
.180. Id., 596 S.E.2d at 414.

181. Id.
182. Id. at 109, 596 S.E.2d at 414.
183.

O.C.G.A. § 9-9-1 (1982 & Supp. 2004).
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agreements to arbitrate disputes may be enforced.1l 4 "Arbitration
cannot be compelled pursuant to the statute with respect to '[any sales
agreement or loan agreement for the purchase or financing of residential
real estate unless the clause agreeing to arbitrate is initialed by all signatories'" when the document is executed. 85 Because the arbitration
provision in the agreement had never been initialed by the Lairds, the
The court further concluded
court stated it could not be enforced."
that even if the Lairds had initialed the provision, they never agreed in
writing to submit to arbitration as required by the agreement.'
Thus, under Georgia law, the homeowners could not be compelled to
submit to binding arbitration."
Although Risbergs argued that the mandatory arbitration provision in
the warranty applied rather than the voluntary arbitration provision in
the sale agreement, the court was not persuaded.' 8 9 Because the
parties' sale agreement referred only to voluntary arbitration, gave no
notice of the warranty's mandatory arbitration provision, and the Lairds
had neither expressly agreed in writing to the mandatory arbitration
provision in the warranty nor elected to sue pursuant to the warranty,
the court held that they were not bound by the warranty's mandatory
arbitration provision. 9 °
B.

Waiver by Inconsistent Conduct

In Macon Water Authority v. City of Forsyth,'9 ' the court was faced,
once again, with the task of determining the enforceability of a party's
agreement to arbitrate. In Macon Water Authority, the Macon Water
Authority ("MWA) entered into a contract with the City of Forsyth for
the provision of electricity to a water treatment plant, which MWA was
planning to renovate. The agreement required mandatory arbitration in
the event of default or dispute by either party on any issue. There was
no contract provision that provided for either party to unilaterally
terminate the agreement. 1'
After the parties' contract was executed, in what later became known
as the Great Flood of 1994, the Ocmulgee River surged over its banks
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Laird, 266 Ga. App. at 108, 596 S.E.2d at 414.
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262 Ga. App. 224, 585 S.E.2d 131 (2003).
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and flooded MWA's water treatment plant, leaving MWA's customers
without service for almost a month. Realizing that the site remained at
risk for repeated flooding, MWA decided to abandon its plans to renovate
its existing site and to build, instead, a new water treatment plant on
higher ground in a nearby county on the other side of the river. MWA
cancelled its contracts to improve the existing water treatment plant
because of the risk of future flooding, and MWA defaulted on its contract
with the City of Forsyth without submitting the issue of termination to
arbitration as required by the contract. After construction was complete
on MWA's new water treatment plant, MWA entered into a new contract
with a different electricity supplier, Tri-County EMC, to provide electric
services to the new water treatment plant.' 93
In response, the City of Forsyth brought an action before the Public
Service Commission ("PSC") against Tri-County EMC, a non-party to its
arbitration agreement, for violation of the Georgia Territorial Electric
Service Act (the "Act"). 194 MWA was not a party to the proceedings.
The administrative hearing determined that Tri-County EMC was free
to contract with MWA because the new facility was not the same
premises under the Act for which the City of Forsyth had contracted to
supply electric services. The PSC proceedings did not adjudicate either
directly or indirectly whether the contract between the City of Forsyth
9
and MWA had been terminated by default or other reasons. '
An arbitration was held on November 13 and 14, 2001, regarding the
contract to provide electric services between the City of Forsyth and
MWA, with the arbitrators awarding the City of Forsyth nearly $1
million in damages against MWA for its default under the contract. The
arbitration award was confirmed, and MWA appealed from the trial
court's order compelling arbitration under the contract to supply
electricity. MWA contended that the City of Forsyth had waived or
abandoned its right to arbitrate by filing its proceeding before the PSC.
MWA further argued that the flood constituted a force majeure, which
served to nullify the parties' contract, including its arbitration
clause.'" The court rejected both contentions.'97
Under Georgia law the right to arbitrate may be waived by inconsistent conduct, such as previously litigating specific legal or factual claims
8
or issues that the party subsequently seeks to arbitrate. 19 Georgia
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courts have held that proceeding to trial over the agreement with the
opposite party and not demanding a stay of litigation to arbitrate are
"inconsistent actions."199 Here, the court concluded the City of Forsyth
had not waived its agreement to arbitrate.2 00 The court concluded that
although the City of Forsyth did file an action before the PSC, its alleged
inconsistent action was with a non-party in a regulatory proceeding that
lacked jurisdiction to compel arbitration.2 ' Furthermore, the parties'
contract dispute was not before the PSC, and the PSC's sole determination was that the new water treatment plant was not subject to the
Georgia Territorial Electric Service Act.2 °2 In fact the superior court,
in the appeal from the PSC determination, expressly ruled that the case
was not "in the posture of a contract dispute between the two parties
[(the City of Forsyth and MWA)] to the contract, MWA not being before
the Court."2 0 ' Because MWA's breach of contract by default was never
litigated, and MWA had expressly abandoned its defense of collateral
estoppel with regard to the PSC proceedings, the court held that the City
of Forsyth did not waive its right to arbitrate.0 4 Moreover, the court
concluded that even though the parties' contract for the provision of
electric services expressly contemplated that the contract's performance
might be disrupted by a flood, the agreement did not provide for
nullification of the contract by a flood, or for the flood to be substituted
for performance of the agreement.0 5 Therefore, the court determined
that the arbitration provision remained enforceable, and the question of
whether the contract was terminated by the flood should have been
submitted to arbitration.2 °
By contrast, the court in Phil Wooden Homes, Inc. v. Ladwig"'
determined that the right to mandatory arbitration was waived by
inconsistent conduct.2 0 ' After a dispute arose concerning the homeowners' alleged nonpayment for "extras" on a home built for them by
Phil Wooden Homes, the construction company filed suit against the
homeowners, who in turn asserted a counterclaim for breach of contract
and expenses of litigation. Even though the homeowners asserted nine
affirmative defenses in their answer, they failed to assert that they were

199. Id. at 225, 585 S.E.2d at 133 (citations omitted).
200. Id.
201. Id. at 226, 585 S.E.2d at 134.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 227-28, 585 S.E.2d at 134-35.
205. Id. at 227, 585 S.E.2d at 134.
206. Id.
207. 262 Ga. App. 792, 586 S.E.2d 697 (2003).
208. Id. at 792, 586 S.E.2d at 698.

2004]

CONSTRUCTION LAW

entitled to mandatory arbitration of their dispute. Additionally, the
homeowners served interrogatories, requests for production of documents, and, eventually, requests for admissions. It was not until after
the discovery period had ended, during which the parties had mutually
sought and obtained a consent order from the trial court extending the
discovery period, that the homeowners first asserted their right to
mandatory arbitration. Despite the delay, the trial court granted their
9
motion to compel arbitration and dismissed the builder's complaint."
The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the homeowners'
actions waived any entitlement they may have had to submit their
dispute to arbitration. 1 ° The court cited its decision from the last
survey period, Wise v. Tidal Construction Co.,2 which held that
defendant in a construction contract dispute waived a mandatory
arbitration clause by conducting discovery, moving for summary
judgment, and entering a consolidated pre-trial order, despite having
212
Here, th
the
raised the issue of mandatory arbitration in its answer.
court reasoned that the homeowners waived their right of arbitration by
inconsistent conduct when they filed a counterclaim and delayed their
demand for mandatory arbitration.1 3 Therefore, the trial court erred
by dismissing the case and ordering the parties to submit to mandatory
arbitration.1 4
C.

Vacation or Modification of ArbitrationAward

Waiver of a different sort was the determining factor in an appeal
from the confirmation of an arbitration award in a residential construction dispute between homeowners and their remodeling contractor. In
Brown v. Premiere Designs, Inc.,215 homeowners Mason and Jeanne
Brown filed a breach of contract action against Premiere Designs, Inc.,
their home remodeling contractor, in July 2001. Premiere answered the
complaint, asserted multiple defenses, and also filed a counterclaim.
Premiere later filed a motion to compel arbitration. The trial court
ordered the parties to submit to arbitration, which resulted in an award
of $15,101 to Premiere. The Browns, who had formerly been represented
by counsel, filed a pro se application asking the court to vacate the
arbitration award. Instead, the court confirmed the award in March
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2003. The Browns appealed, arguing that the award should be vacated
the arbitrator had
due to errors committed by the arbitrator and because
216
failed to maintain a record of the proceedings.
At the time of the parties' dispute, the Georgia Arbitration Code set
forth four statutory grounds for vacating an arbitration award upon the
application of a party subject to the award under O.C.G.A. section 9-913(b).2 17 The statute provided that an arbitration award shall be
vacated only
if the court finds that the rights of the applying party were prejudiced
by: (1) Corruption, fraud, or misconduct in procuring the award; (2)
Partiality of an arbitrator appointed as a neutral; (3) An overstepping
by the arbitrators of their authority or such imperfect execution of it
that a final and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was
not made; or (4) A failure to follow the procedure of [the] (Code), unless
the party applying to vacate the award continued with the arbitration
with notice of this failure and without objection.218
In 2003 the Georgia General Assembly amended the Georgia Arbitration
Code to add a fifth ground: "The arbitrator's manifest disregard of the
law."219 Because the Browns' suit was filed prior22to that amendment
taking effect, the court concluded it did not apply.
O.C.G.A. section 9-9-8(e) 221 provides that "[tihe arbitrators shall
maintain a record of all pleadings, documents, testimony, and other
matters introduced at the hearing. The arbitrators or any party to the
proceeding may have the proceedings transcribed by a court reportThe parties may waive this requirement by written consent or
er."'
by continuing with the arbitration without objection.2u
Here, the court noted that the parties had waived the statutory
requirement in two ways: (1) the arbitration award showed that prior to
the arbitration hearing, both sides had waived the statutory requirement
that the arbitrator preserve a record of the arbitration proceedings; and
(2) the parties continued with the arbitration without objection.224
Consequently, the court held that the arbitration award was not subject
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to being vacated under O.C.G.A. section 9-9-13(b)(4) based on the
arbitrator's failure to record the proceeding.2 2
Although Premiere had moved to dismiss the Browns' appeal on the
grounds that there was no transcript of the arbitration hearing, the
court denied Premiere's motion, ruling that the absence of a transcript
is a ground for affirmance of the judgment rather than dismissal of the
appeal.22 6 Because the absence of a record or transcript precluded the
court's review of the Browns' claims of error allegedly committed by the
arbitrator, the court consequently affirmed the state court's refusal to
vacate the arbitration award on any of the asserted grounds.227
In yet another residential construction dispute, Marchelletta v. Seay
Construction Services,22 the homeowners, Gerard and Sandy Marchel-

letta, appealed from two superior court orders stemming from a contract
dispute with Seay Construction Services, Inc. ("Seay") over the construction of the Marchelletta's new home in Fulton County, Georgia. In
November 1999 the parties entered into a written contract for the
construction of an upscale stone home. Almost immediately, the
homeowners began requesting numerous and significant changes to the
project, including grading changes, an increase in the size of their home,
and high-end upgrades to the floors, slate steps, and custom kitchen
cabinets. Costs rose, coordination problems occurred, and the homeowners' indecision about where to place a specialty brick pizza oven
caused months of delay to the structural framing, electrical and HVAC
inspections, as well as installation of the sheetrock and insulation.
When the parties' differences reached an impasse, the homeowners
terminated their contract. 2" Seay filed a lien and demanded arbitration under the parties' contract pursuant to the following arbitration
clause: "All claims and disputes arising out of, or relating to this
agreement, or breach thereof, shall be decided by binding arbitration in
Rules and Procedures of Construction Arbitration
accordance with 2the
30
Associates, Ltd."

Seay sought payment of its fee, plus out-of-pocket costs, for a total of
$84,412.74. The homeowners filed a counterclaim in the arbitration,
seeking setoffs of $327,000 for what they claimed were structural
An arbitration was
deficiencies and other construction defects.
scheduled and directed by the arbitrator to proceed at the Marchelletas'
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home so that the defects could be seen by the arbitrator and witnesses.
The Marchelletas sought two continuances of the arbitration, then filed
an action in the Superior Court of Fulton County asking: (1) to have the
provision of the Georgia Arbitration Code, which permits the arbitrator
to set the venue for the hearing, declared unconstitutional; (2) to recover
damages for trespass relating to an effort by Seay and a building
inspector to determine if a subcontractor was working without a license;
and (3) to receive an injunction prohibiting any future trespasses. 1
Seay filed a motion for summary judgment, which was granted in part
in March 2002, and the construction contract dispute was returned to
arbitration. The homeowners were ordered to make their premises
available for inspection both before and during the arbitration. Seay
was granted summary judgment on the trespass, venue, and punitive
damages allegations. The arbitration was conducted, and an award was
issued that found the homeowners owed Seay $78,959 on the contract,
and $5400 in arbitrator and administrative fees, for a total of $84,359.
The arbitration award, including fees, was confirmed by the trial court,
which also awarded Seay $3000 in attorney fees pursuant to O.C.G.A.
section 9-15-14.232 In addition the court added St. Paul Fire & Marine
Insurance Company as a party because it was the surety on a bond that
the homeowners posted in order to discharge Seay's lien on their
property. The court entered an amended judgment in March 2003,
foreclosing the special lien on the proceeds of the bond posted by St. Paul
Fire & Marine. 3
In response to Seay's motion to confirm the award, the Marchellettas
filed a motion to vacate on the grounds, among others, that "'the award
is vague and imperfect, and on the grounds the Arbitrator failed to
follow the procedure of [O.C.G.A. section] 9-9-11,'" which deals with the
circumstances under which an award may be changed by the arbitrator
upon motion of a participant. 2 ' The Marchellettas claimed that,
regarding the alleged construction defects, the arbitrator's award failed
to reflect how the arbitrator ruled on the homeowners' counterclaim. In
addition the homeowners asserted that Seay was requesting interest not
legally permissible under the award; the award did not establish the
lien; and joinder of St. Paul as a necessary party was not permitted
under O.C.G.A. section 9-11-14.235
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Citing the "severely curtailed" role of the trial court in deciding
whether to confirm or vacate an arbitration award, the court again
enumerated the four statutory grounds for vacating an award pursuant
to O.C.G.A. section 9-9-13(b), which were applicable to the parties'
dispute." 6 As in Brown, the fifth ground added by the Georgia
General Assembly by amendment in 2003-the arbitrator's manifest
disregard of the law--did not apply.2" 7 The court restricted its consideration to the only two statutory grounds raised by the homeowners:
overstepping authority/imperfect execution; and failure to follow
procedure of the statute, O.C.G.A. sections 9-9-13(b)(3) and (4).2"8
The court of appeals denied the homeowners' motion to vacate on all
grounds." 9 First, the court stated that no pre-award interest was
included in the amount awarded to Seay, and even if it had been
included, under current Georgia law, that would not be grounds for
vacating the award.240 Second, the court did not believe that the
arbitrator's award was imperfect in execution, or that there was any
legal mandate that the award include specific findings with regard to the
homeowner's counterclaim." 1 According to the court, the record
showed that the arbitrator considered, and rejected, the homeowner's
counterclaim, except for an amount that the arbitrator credited for a
construction defect in the homeowners' residence. 42 Third, the court
of appeals concluded the joinder of St. Paul was not a reversible error
because even if St. Paul was not strictly an indispensable party, the
homeowners' counsel had acknowledged they were "a necessary party
whose joinder could have been ordered by the court absent a motion."2 "
Finally, because in the court's view, the homeowners' legal arguments
during the initial litigation, the subsequent arbitration, and on appeal
were wholly without merit and provided no basis for vacating the
arbitrator's award, the court affirmed the trial court's award of attorney
The court also granted Seay's
fees to the construction company.2
by O.C.G.A. section 5-6provided
penalty
request for the ten percent
2 46
6245 for frivolous appeal.
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Arbitrability of Appellate Attorney Fees

In Yates Paving & Grading Co. v. Bryan County,247 the Superior
Court of Chatham County denied Yates Paving & Grading Company,
Inc.'s ("Yates") motion to compel further arbitration on the issue of
attorney fees and costs incurred after Bryan County ("County") appealed
an arbitration award with regard to a road construction contract
between the parties. The parties had entered into a construction
contract to build and improve public roads in a subdivision in Richmond
Hill. 21 The agreement contained a termination clause specifying how
Yates would be paid upon termination, as well as the following binding
arbitration clause: "All claims, disputes and other matters in question
between OWNER and CONTRACTOR arising out of, or relating to the
will be decided by
Contract Documents or the breach thereof
arbitration."249
Yates was terminated after construction began, and the County hired
a third party to complete the project. As provided under its contract
with the County, Yates demanded arbitration, and notified the County
of its intent to seek enforcement of its claims under the Georgia Prompt
Pay Act ("Act"), O.C.G.A. section 13-11_1,25o as well as attorney fees
pursuant to the Act.251 The Act provides that the prevailing party may
recover "a reasonable fee for the services of its attorney including but not
limited to trial and appeal and arbitration,in an amount to be determined by the court or the arbitrators, as the case may be."252 An
arbitration hearing was scheduled, but the County withdrew from the
proceedings at the last minute, contending that due to lack of the
requisite governmental authority, it could not submit to binding
arbitration. The County filed an action in superior court seeking
injunctive relief, stay of the arbitration proceedings, and a declaratory
judgment on the question of governmental authority. Yates moved to lift
the stay and counterclaimed for recovery of its costs and attorney fees
under the Georgia Prompt Pay Act, as well as recovery of its costs and
attorney fees under its contract. The trial court found that the County
had authority to enter into a binding agreement to arbitrate, and

246. Marchelletta,265 Ga. App. at 29-30, 593 S.E.2d at 69.
247. 265 Ga. App. 578, 594 S.E.2d 756 (2004).
248. Id. at 579, 594 S.E.2d at 758.
249. Id.
250. O.C.G.A. § 13-11-1 (Supp. 2004).
251. Yates Paving, 265 Ga. App. at 579, 594 S.E.2d at 758.
252. Id. (citing O.C.G.A. § 13-11-8 (2004)) (emphasis added).

2004]

CONSTRUCTION LAW

ordered the parties to arbitrate their dispute, but did not rule on Yates's
counterclaim.2 53
After the arbitration hearing, Yates was awarded $430,335, plus fees,
including attorney fees, and the superior court confirmed the award.
The County appealed to the court of appeals, once again arguing that it
lacked authority to enter into binding arbitration."
The court of
appeals affirmed the arbitration award and the lower court's holding
that the County did not exceed its authority in executing a contract that
provided for arbitration, and that arbitration was expressly provided for
in the parties' contract. 5
Yates then filed a motion seeking a second arbitration, which related
solely to the issue of appellate attorney fees and costs that it had
incurred in defense of the original arbitration award. The lower court
denied Yates's motion, finding that despite a provision in the parties'
arbitration agreement for the award of attorney fees and costs, that
provision did not encompass appellate attorney fees.2
The court of appeals reversed, determining that the parties' valid and
enforceable arbitration clause at issue was unambiguous and clearly
provided that "all claims, disputes, and 'other matters' relating to the
contract will be decided by arbitration," which included the issue of
appellate attorney fees. 2 7 The court pointed out that the contract's
arbitration clause made no distinction on the type of attorney fees.255
Moreover, Yates's counterclaim against the County sought to enforce
Yates's claims under the Georgia Prompt Pay Act, which expressly
provides for the recovery of attorney fees on appeal, regardless of
whether such claims are litigated or arbitrated.25 9 Thus, the court
stated, "[slince Yates is entitled to seek appellate attorney fees under the
Prompt Pay Act, and ... 'the parties' contract explicitly required
arbitration of all disputes ... 7the fee issue must be resolved by further
' 26
arbitration. 5

253. Id. at 579-80, 594 S.E.2d at 758.
254.

Id. at 580, 594 S.E.2d at 758.

255. Id.
256. Id. at 580-81, 594 S.E.2d at 759.
257. Id. at 581, 594 S.E.2d at 759.
258. Id. at 582, 594 S.E.2d at 759.
259. Id. (citing O.C.G.A. § 13-11-1).
260. Id., 594 S.E.2d at 760 (quoting Doman v. Stapleton, 256 Ga. App. 383,388-89, 568
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LEGISLATION

The Georgia General Assembly passed several pieces of legislation
relevant to construction law. Contractors are now required to be
licensed."' Additionally, the General Assembly adopted a law that
requires homeowners to send general contractors specific notice of
construction defects ninety days prior to initiating an "action," which is
defined as litigation or arbitration.2 62
A.

Licensing and General Contractors

The Georgia General Assembly amended Chapter 41 of Title 43 of the
O.C.G.A.2" The act requires both residential and general contractors
to seek licensure from the State. 2 4 The party seeking a license must
meet certain criteria and take an examination. 2" The act also creates
a State Licensing Board to oversee the licensure process. 6 6
B.

ADR Process for Homeowner Claims

The Georgia General Assembly has created an alternative dispute
resolution process for homeowner construction defect claims.2 67 The
statute outlines a procedure whereby a homeowner notifies a contractor
of defects so the contractor has an opportunity to either pay for repairs
or cure, all in the hope that the parties might avoid the time and
expense of litigation or arbitration. 2
Most importantly, the statute
requires a homeowner to provide written notice of a claim ninety days
before initiating an "action" against a contractor. 21 "Action" is defined
as "any civil lawsuit, judicial action, or arbitration proceeding asserting
a claim in whole or in part for damages or other relief in connection with
a dwelling caused by an alleged construction defect."27 6

261. O.C.G.A.
262. O.C.G.A.
263. O.C.G.A.
264. O.C.G.A.
265. Id.
266. O.C.G.A.
267. O.C.G.A.
268. Id.
269. O.C.G.A.
270. O.C.G.A.

§
§
§
§

43-41-6 (2004).
8-2-38(a) (2004).
43-41-1 (2004).
43-41-6 (2004).

§ 43-41-3 (2004).
§§ 8-2-35 to -43 (2004).
§ 8-2-38(a).
§ 8-2-36(1).
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C. Change to State Minimum Standard Codes for Construction
The legislature amended Part 2 of Article 1 of Chapter 2 of Title 8 of
the O.C.G.A.2 7' The legislature took this action to change the State
Minimum Standard Codes for Construction, delete obsolete provisions,
and to revise provisions in accordance with new codes.272 Most
importantly, the legislature redefined what constitutes "state minimum
standard codes."273
D. Manufactured Homes
The Georgia legislature adopted "The Uniform Standards Code for
Manufactured Homes Act." 274 The Act is designed to establish new
guidelines regarding manufactured home construction and safety
standards. 5
Utility Contractors
The legislature amended Chapter 14 of Title 43 of the O.C.G.A.,
relating to electrical contractors, plumbers, conditioned air contractors,
low-voltage contractors, and utility contractors. 6 Most importantly,
the legislature added language requiring persons holding utility
manager and utility foreman certificates to "submit proof to the division
of completion of a safety training course approved by the division at
least every two years from the date of the completion of the initial safety
training course. " '

E.

VI.

MISCELLANEOUS

This section contains cases that do not fall neatly into one of the other
previously discussed topics or categories. Noncompliance with state law
and indemnification are the two main topics.
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Contractor Theft
In Smith v. State,2 78 a contractor was convicted of theft by taking
under O.C.G.A. section 16-8-2279 for failing to perform construction
work as promised. The victim hired Jimmy Smith, who claimed to
employ a crew of thirty men, to build a garage. The parties' written
contract provided that the homeowner would pay half the contract
amount as a downpayment, and the balance as the work progressed.28 °
Work was scheduled to begin the next day, and Smith promised to be
finished within eight weeks. Instead of beginning work as promised,
Smith allowed three weeks to pass with only one laborer showing up for
a day and a half to prepare the site. When confronted about the lack of
progress, Smith lied to the victim, claiming that the lumber and other
materials were back-ordered. Later, Smith, a laborer, and a subcontractor spent two more days pouring footings for the foundation, but the
footings failed inspection twice.
After the footings finally passed
inspection, the concrete slab for the garage was poured. With one minor
exception, no further work was performed.28 '
The homeowner called Smith repeatedly throughout the eight week
period, first trying to get the work completed, and later to get his money
back. Smith failed to return his calls. When the homeowner finally
confronted Smith at his house, Smith promised to complete the garage,
arrived the next day on the site, and worked till lunch, but never
returned. Months went by with no contact from Smith. By chance, the
victim ran into Smith one day at a local store. Smith, in front of
witnesses, promised to pay the money back the next day at the victim's
home, but he never showed up.282
Smith was charged with theft by taking, and a trial was scheduled.
Just prior to trial, Smith contacted the victim and once again promised
to pay the money he owed the victim if the victim would drop the
criminal charges.2" Although he apologized to the victim and his wife,
telling them, "I'm sorry I ripped you off," he once again failed to follow
through with a refund of the money.2"
O.C.G.A. section 16-8-2 provides that "[a] person commits the offense
of theft by taking when he unlawfully takes or, being in lawful
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possession thereof, unlawfully appropriates any property of another with
the intention of depriving him of the property, regardless of the manner
in which the property is taken or appropriated." 5 The last phrase,
"regardless of the manner in which the property is taken or appropriated,"" 6 has been broadly interpreted to encompass a wide variety of
schemes for depriving people of their property.28 7 If a contractor
accepts or retains a homeowner's money with no intention of satisfying
his obligations under the construction contract, under Georgia law, a
jury is authorized to find him guilty of theft by taking."s
Here, the court of appeals concluded that Smith was guilty of theft by
taking when he accepted the victim's downpayment, but abandoned the
project. 9 Though Smith promised to return the unearned portion of
the amount he had been paid, he failed to do so. Smith's conduct was
also part of a pattern. Over Smith's protest, the trial court admitted
evidence of two similar transactions that did not result in criminal
charges. In each transaction Smith misrepresented to homeowners how
quickly he could begin work, and that he had a crew of thirty men. He
accepted downpayments, but barely started work before abandoning the
projects entirely. He avoided the customers' phone calls and failed to
refund the unearned portions of the downpayments. 290 Determining
that the trial court met the three-prong test for admitting evidence of
similar transactions, the court held the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in admitting such evidence.291
B.

Indemnification

In CSX Transportation, Inc. v. City of Garden City,2" a Georgia
municipality, Garden City, executed agreements with CSX Transportation, Inc. and its affiliates ("CSX") to use a railroad right-of-way to
install water and sewer lines. Garden City agreed to indemnify and hold
harmless CSX for all liabilities the company incurred in connection with
the project for which the company was not the sole cause. Garden City
also agreed to maintain insurance to cover its indemnity obligations.
After a passenger train collided with a tractor trailer operated by one of
Garden City's subcontractors, causing significant property damage to
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CSX and subjecting CSX to third party claims, CSX sought indemnification from Garden City pursuant to its agreements. Garden City refused,
contending that the indemnification provision constituted an impermissible waiver of the City's sovereign immunity.293 The Georgia Supreme
Court agreed.
Georgia municipalities are creatures of the state, and allocations of
power are strictly construed.295 Sovereign immunity applies to all
actions when a Georgia municipality is a party.296 The question
whether Garden City was authorized to enter into an indemnification
agreement with a private third party, thereby waiving its sovereign
immunity, is controlled by specific legislative provisions authorizing the
waiver of sovereign immunity.297 In the context of tort liability and
insurance coverage, the Georgia General Assembly, through O.C.G.A.
section 36-33-1(a), 29" has authorized only a narrow waiver of sovereign
immunity:
A municipal corporation shall not waive its [sovereign) immunity by
the purchase of liability insurance, except as provided in Code Section
33-24-51, or unless the policy of insurance issued covers an occurrence
for which the defense of sovereign immunity is available, and then only
to the extent of the limits of such insurance policy.'
When a municipal contract is beyond the power or authority of the local
government to perform under any circumstances, it is void as an ultra
vires contract.3 °
Here, the agreements between Garden City and CSX required Garden
City to provide indemnification for "all liability, loss, claim, suit,
damage, charge, or expense which CSX may suffer, sustain, incur or in
any way be subjected to ... except when caused solely by the fault or
negligence of CSX." 0 ' Construing O.C.G.A. section 36-33-1, the court
determined there was no statutory authority that permitted Garden City
to waive its sovereign immunity by contracting to indemnify a private

293. Id. at 248, 588 S.E.2d at 688-89.
294. Id. at 249-50, 588 S.E.2d at 689.
295. Id. at 249, 588 S.E.2d at 689 (citing O.C.G.A § 36-34-1 (2004)).
296. Id. (citations omitted).
297. Id.
298. O.C.G.A. § 36-33-1(a) (2004).
299. CSX Transp., 277 Ga. at 250, 588 S.E.2d at 689 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 36-33-1(a)
(quoted in part)).
300. Id., 588 S.E.2d at 690 (citing Newsome v. City of Union Point, 249 Ga. 434, 436,
291 S.E.2d 712, 714 (1972); R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Local Government and Contracts that
Bind, 3 GA. L. REv. 546 (1968)).
301. Id.
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third party.3 0 2 Thus, the indemnification agreement between the
parties was void as an ultra vires contract. 30 3
However, to the extent the facts behind CSX's action against Garden
City fell within the scope of insurance coverage provided by Garden
,City's participation in the Georgia Interlocal Risk Management Agency
(GIRMA), a multi-government insurance fund, and sovereign immunity
would otherwise apply to that cause of action, the court held that
Garden City's sovereign immunity would be waived to the extent of such
liability coverage.'°4
Public policy and indemnification again played a pivotal role 3in
0
Federated Department Stores v. Superior Drywall & Acoustical, Inc. 1
In Federated, a contractor, Orion Building Corporation ("Orion"), was
hired by Federated's Rich's department store in Macon ("Federated") to
perform extensive renovations. Superior Drywall & Acoustical, Inc.
("Superior") was hired to install the drywall. To ensure that the store
remained open for business during the renovation project, a series of
temporary sheetrock walls known commonly in the industry as "dust
walls" were erected to separate and block the construction areas from
public access, as well as to insulate the public areas from construction
dust and noise.3" 6
To make the shopping areas more attractive for customers, Federated
directed that Orion cover the dust walls with decorative curtains. Floorlength curtains were suspended along the outside of the dust walls from
metal rods connected to free-standing poles in metal bases, which were
only partially hidden behind the curtains. Orion's superintendent did
not pass the task of hanging the curtains along to Superior. °7
After sustaining a serious injury as a result of tripping over one of the
metal bases while shopping, a customer filed a complaint against
Federated and Orion. Although the drywall contractor did not cause the
fall, Superior was joined as a third-party defendant based upon a
contractual provision in its contract with Orion which provided that
Superior would be responsible for performing not only the drywall work,
but also the installation of the temporary dust partitions and Federatedfurnished dust curtains. The trial court granted Superior's motion for
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summary judgment, which was premised upon Orion's and Federated's
sole liability for plaintiff's injuries. Orion and Federated appealed. °8
Under O.C.G.A. section 13-8-2(b), °9 it is against public policy to
indemnify or hold harmless a party to a contract for the construction,
alteration, repair, or maintenance of a building against liability for
damages arising out of bodily injury to persons resulting from the sole
negligence of the promisee.3 1 0 Here, by contract, Superior was required to purchase contractor's general liability insurance to cover
Superior against its own negligent acts in its execution of the work. The
insurance Superior purchased did not cover claims made against Orion
Superior's contract, however, also contained an
or Federated. 11
indemnification clause, which stated:
Subcontractor hereby assumes entire responsibility and liability for all
damage or injury of any kind or nature (including death resulting
therefrom) to all persons, whether employees of Subcontractor or
otherwise, and to all property caused by, resulting from, arising out of
or occurring in connection with the execution of the Work, [e]xcept to
the extent, if any, expressly prohibited by statute, should any claims
for such damage or injury, including direct attorney[] fees and any
judgments or disbursements, that Orion, Owner [(Federated)], their
officers, agents,12 and employees may directly or indirectly incur as a
result thereof.
Federated argued that an "insurance exception" to Georgia's public
policy prohibition rendered Superior's indemnity provision enforceable
under precedent established by the Georgia Court of Appeals and the
Georgia Supreme Court, and that the parties had mutually agreed the
risk of loss would be shifted to the insurance coverage obtained by
Superior.313 The court was not persuaded." 4 Despite having agreed
to such a broad sweeping contractual indemnification provision, Superior
prevailed.315
Although the court stated that the type of insurance and the intent of
the parties plays a part in the analysis, the court examined no evidence
that indicated anything in Superior's agreement with Orion expressed
a mutual intention that the insurance would cover the negligent acts of
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Federated.3 16 Instead, the record indicated that Superior procured,
and was asked to procure, contractor's general liability insurance solely
for its own protection.317 Also cutting against Federated's "mutual
intent" argument was that Federated had agreed to provide its own
Builder's Risk insurance, which covered Federated's liability "'for any
in aries allegedly occurring on the premises that would be the result of
negligence or fault"' of Federated.31
Absent an insurance clause
demonstrating the parties' mutual intent for Superior's insurance to
provide coverage for loss or damages incurred by both parties, the court
held that Superior's indemnity clause was void and unenforceable
pursuant to O.C.G.A. section 13-8-2(b).319
In National Gypsum of Georgia v. Ploof CarriersCorp. ,320 a trucking
company employee tripped and fell on National Gypsum's loading dock
while trying to cover a load of wallboard with a tarp. The trucking
company, Ploof Carriers ("Ploof'), had contractually agreed to indemnify
and hold harmless National Gypsum for all injuries to Ploof's employees
that occurred on National Gypsum's property, except when the indemnitee, National Gypsum, was solely negligent.321
Ploof's employee sued National Gypsum, who sought indemnity and
attorney fees from Ploof in a third party claim. The trial court granted
Ploof's motion for summary judgment, finding that no evidence had been
presented that Ploof was negligent, even if its employee had failed to
exercise ordinary care for his own safety. On appeal National Gypsum
contended that the trial court erred in granting partial summary
judgment to Ploof on its indemnity obligation because National Gypsum
had submitted adequate proof that Ploof was negligent.322
The agreement between Ploof and National Gypsum contained the
following indemnity clause:
[Ploofi shall be solely responsible for and agrees to indemnify, defend
and hold [National Gypsum] harmless from any claims, demands,
damages, costs, attorney[] fees, expenses and legal proceedings of any
type for injury to, the death of, or damage to the property of, any
employee, contractor, or agent of [Ploof] who performs any work for
[Ploof] pursuant to this agreement, whether such injury, death or
damage occurs on [National Gypsum's] property or anywhere else, and
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even if such injury, death or damage is claimed to have been caused by
/National Gypsum's] acts or omissions; provided that nothing herein
shall require [Ploof] to be responsible to indemnify [National Gypsum]
for the amount of any final judgment in which it has been found that
such injury, death or loss or damage to property was caused solely by
[National Gypsum's] negligence.323
The court of appeals agreed that the trial court erred, but for a
different reason.3 24 Acknowledging that a conflict between two previous court of appeals opinions had created confusion with regard to
indemnity obligations, the court took the opportunity to overrule its
opinion in Proctor& Gamble PaperProducts Co. v. Yeargin Construction
Co.325 The court in Proctor & Gamble held that the indemnified party
must show negligence on the part of the employer/indemnitor, rather
than contributory negligence on the part of the employee, before the
The court
employer's indemnification obligation was triggered.126
expressly overruled that holding based on the specific indemnity
language at issue in that case.327
Instead, the court clarified that Ploof's indemnity obligation turned not
on the question of whether Ploof was negligent, but rather on whether
328
plaintiff's injury was due to National Gypsum's sole negligence.
Because National Gypsum had submitted evidence that created a
genuine issue of material fact on whether plaintiff employee failed to
exercise ordinary care for his own safety, the court held that partial
summary judgment for the trucking company on the wallboard
a
manufacturer's indemnity claim should not have been granted."
In Anderson v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co.,330 U.S.
Fidelity and Guaranty Company ("USF&G") issued performance and
payment bonds on behalf of Eagle Construction Company of Georgia, Inc.
("Eagle") for construction contracts by and between Eagle, various
owners, and prime contractors on projects throughout the southeastern
United States. The bonds guaranteed that Eagle would complete its
construction contracts and pay its suppliers and subcontractors. In
return Eagle executed a master surety agreement ("indemnity agreement") in favor of USF&G, which indemnified and held harmless the
surety from any and all liabilities, including, among others, all amounts
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paid by the surety in good faith under the belief that it was or might be
liable.3 3 '
After Eagle suffered financial difficulties and became unable to
complete certain projects or pay its subcontractors and suppliers,
USF&G received claims on some of the bonds it had issued. Eventually,
USF&G filed an action seeking reimbursement of its expenses pursuant
to its obligations under the bonds and moved for summary judgment.
In support of its summary judgment motion, USF&G filed affidavits
showing the damages, including an itemized statement of losses,
expenses, and costs that USF&G had incurred from the bonds it had
issued on behalf of Eagle. 32
Eagle challenged the court's judgment in favor of USF&G on three
bases: (1) that the billing summaries and statements contained in
USF&G's affidavits were inadmissible hearsay; (2) that two affidavits
submitted by USF&G were not sworn to by an officer of USF&G as
allegedly required by the parties' indemnity agreement; and (3) the
affidavits contained documents that were inherently unreliable. Eagle
3
did not dispute that they were bound by the indemnity agreement.
3
'
merit.
without
The court determined that Eagle's arguments were
By signing the indemnity agreement, the court stated Eagle expressly
agreed that the evidence of USF&G's payments on behalf of Eagle, and
itemized statements sworn to by an officer of USF&G, would be prima
facie evidence of the fact and extent of Eagle's liability.335 Moreover,
the enforceability of the indemnity agreement, not the underlying bonds,
was the issue before the court. 3 6 Once USF&G met its burden, the
burden shifted to Eagle to point to evidence of bad faith on the part of
USF&GY 7 Because there was no evidence of bad faith on the surety's
part, the court affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment on
the issue of liability and damages. 8
C. EIFS; Insurance; Garnishment
In Dowse v. Southern Guaranty Insurance Co.,319 plaintiffs filed suit
against a contractor for defective construction in the installation of an
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"exterior insulation and finishing system" ("EIFS") on their home,
alleging negligence, breach of warranty, and bad faith. The contractor,
who was insured under a general commercial liability policy, gave timely
notice of the suit to its insurer. The insurer responded by advising the
contractor that the claims brought against it by plaintiff were not
covered by the general commercial liability policy it had issued to the
contractor, and declined to defend or indemnify the contractor. After the
insurer refused to provide a defense or indemnification, the contractor
entered into a settlement agreement with plaintiff. As part of the
agreement, the contractor dismissed its answer to plaintiff's complaint.
Plaintiff then filed for entry of a default and requested a hearing on
damages. The trial court tried the issue of damages, and a judgment
was rendered for plaintiff in the amount of $83,040.29, together with
interest and costs.34°
Plaintiff subsequently filed a garnishment action against the insurer,
claiming that the insurance policy issued to the contractor was a
garnishable asset. The insurer answered, maintaining that it was not
in possession of any funds that were subject to the garnishment and also
moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted the insurer's
motion for summary judgment, and plaintiff appealed. Plaintiff argued
that the trial court erred in holding that the release of the contractor
had the effect of releasing the insurer from any liability under the
insurance policy.3 4' The appellate court agreed because:
[I]n Georgia, "[wihen an insurer denies coverage and absolutely refuses
to defend an action against an insured when it could do so with
reservation of its rights as to coverage, the legal consequence of such
refusal is that it waives the provisions of the policy against a settlement by the insured and becomes bound to pay the amount of any
settlement made in good faith, plus expenses and attorney[] fees." 2
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